

Philosophy Paper 108: The Philosophy of Logic and Language

4. Propositional Attitudes

READING

Robert M. Martin, *The Meaning of Language* (MIT Press, 1987), chapters 18 and 19.

An introductory book that gives a useful overview, relating the problem of psychological contexts to Frege.

* Mark Richard, "Propositional Attitude Ascription", in Michael Devitt and Richard Hanley (eds), *The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language* (Blackwell, 2006), pp. 186-211. Mark Richard also has a chapter on "Propositional Attitudes" in Bob Hale and Crispin Wright (eds), *Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language* (Blackwell, 1997), pp. 197-226.

* W. V. O. Quine, "Vagaries of Reference", in Peter Ludlow (ed.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Language* (MIT Press, 1997).

This is an extract from Quine's book Word and Object, usefully and economically bringing together some of the famous key points of his seminal discussions. If you want to read more on Quine, the recommendation would be:

W. V. O. Quine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes", in Leonard Linsky (ed.), *Reference and Modality* (Oxford Readings, 1971), pp. 101-111.

A classic paper by Quine, pointing out the problems of "quantifying in" to propositional attitude contexts. If you have time, it would also be worth reading the first two sections of his earlier paper "Reference and Modality" in the same collection (pp. 17-26), and perhaps Kaplan's response to the second paper, called "Quantifying In" (pp. 112-44 in Linsky).

Donald Davidson, "Saying That", in Peter Ludlow (ed.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Language* (MIT Press, 1997), pp. 817-31.

Davidson's "paratactic" analysis is a classic and you need to know what it is, but not necessarily to consider it in detail. For a critique, see:

Stephen Schiffer, "Sententialist Theories of Belief", in Peter Ludlow (ed.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Language* (MIT Press, 1997), pp. 855-73.

* Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames (eds), *Propositions and Attitudes* (OUP, 1988).

Although this collection is not as useful as some others in the series, its introduction is worth reading in itself, giving the editors' perspective on the issues. Salmon is very keen on a "direct reference" account of these matters.

* Saul Kripke, "A Puzzle about Belief", in Salmon and Soames, pp. 102-48, and also in Peter Ludlow (ed.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Language* (MIT Press, 1997), pp. 875-920.

* Mark Crimmins and John Perry, "The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs", in Peter Ludlow (ed.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Language* (MIT Press, 1997), pp. 963-91.

Slightly off on a tangent is another influential paper by Perry:

John Perry, "The Problem of the Essential Indexical", in Salmon and Soames, pp. 83-101.

Peter Millican, Section V of "Content, Thoughts, and Definite Descriptions", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 64 (1990), pp. 167-203, but best read in the misprint-free version on the Web at <http://philosophy.hertford.ox.ac.uk/papers/1990Content.doc>.

This gives a rather summary statement of some of my own views, and makes reference to various other items that might be of interest (e.g. Stich's account of belief ascription, or the Dennett paper below).

Daniel Dennett, "Beyond Belief", in Andrew Woodfield (ed.), *Thought and Object* (OUP, 1982), pp. 1-95 and reprinted with some additional "Reflections" in Dennett, *The Intentional Stance* (MIT Press, 1987), pp. 117-211.